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"Two things fill the soul with awe and reverence: the starry sky above me and the moral law within me. These are for me proof that there is a God above me and a God within me."
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason
Hello! To celebrate the 300th birthday of the eminent philosopher Immanuel Kant, I decided to write a short article introducing the author of Critique of Pure Reason. This will be a compilation of my more important texts about the philosopher from Königsberg. According to Heidegger, one might say of Kant that he was born, thought, and died.
Personally, I think this is an unjustified and absurd simplification, as Kant was not only a great thinker but also an interesting person. Kant was born on April 22, 1724, in Königsberg, and died on February 12, 1804, also in Königsberg. The philosopher led a life devoted to science and knowledge, and his work turned out to be groundbreaking for philosophy. Kant was comprehensively educated, as evidenced by the fact that he taught logic, metaphysics, mathematics, physics, and geography. Kant's broad intellectual horizons led him to achieve a "Copernican revolution" in philosophy. His achievements in epistemology proved particularly significant. In 1781, his main and most famous work, Critique of Pure Reason, was published.
Let me quote my favorite passage from this work. In it, Kant writes in a truly poetic way:
"We have not only traversed the land of pure intellect, not only have we carefully examined every part of it, but we have also traversed it and marked a place for everything in it. However, this land is an island, enclosed by nature itself within immutable boundaries. It is a land of truth (what a delightful name!), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the proper abode of illusion, where many a fog bank and rapidly melting ice falsely pretend to be new lands and, deceiving the sailor seeking discoveries with endlessly futile hopes, entangle him in adventures from which he can never withdraw nor complete.
Before we dare [to venture] onto this sea to explore all its expanses and ascertain [whether] there is anything to expect from them, it will be useful first to glance at the map of the country we are about to leave and ask, first, whether we could be content with what it contains, or whether we must necessarily be content if there is no other land where we could settle; secondly, by what right we even possess this country and can maintain ourselves in it securely against all hostile claims."
Why is it worth reaching for this work of Kant? Because it represents a revolutionary philosophical system that allows us to view the issue of knowledge in a completely new way. Speaking with slight exaggeration, Kant's work is, in terms of form, like Cortazar's Hopscotch and in terms of content like James Joyce's Ulysses, that is to say, it deals with everything in a systematic way.
While one might criticize the author for endless sentences in which it is easy to get lost, their cognitive value is worth the effort, as it constitutes not merely "art for art's sake" but a profound and creative work, like the musical compositions of J.S. Bach. Kant was a distinguished philosopher and is still considered one of the pioneers of modern epistemology. In my opinion, the most interesting part of the Critique is the one dealing with the theory of knowledge. Kant's portrayal of the cognitive process is fascinating and inspiring for anyone interested in epistemology, and concepts such as the synthetic unity of apperception, categories of pure intellect, or phenomenon and noumenon ("thing in itself") possess significant cognitive value.
Kant can be boldly compared to Aristotle, as both had extremely broad horizons and aspired to develop creatively in all major fields of knowledge.
As Kant himself stated (although in another of his works, Critique of Practical Reason): "Two things fill the soul with awe and reverence: the starry sky above me and the moral law within me," thus defining the realm of his inquiries (morality, cosmology, philosophy). Therefore, I recommend all philosophers return to Kant's work, as it is not only a mandatory reading for them but also an extraordinary literary phenomenon. Although Kant's work is not easy to read and requires special attention and focus, making it unsuitable for evening reading but rather in the light of day, it is certainly worth recommending as it inspired many contemporary philosophical currents such as phenomenology (Husserl, Heidegger, Ingarden) or neo-Kantianism.
To sum up, it is worth reaching for Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as it is an essential part of contemporary philosophy, particularly epistemology.
Remaining within the scope of Critique of Pure Reason, I will present my own critique of Kant's critique, specifically his epistemological concept:
Critique of Kant's Epistemological Concept
The Issue of the Possibility of A Priori Knowledge
The most important issue addressed by Kant is the principle of a priori knowledge. He assumed that the intellect, in the process of "transcendental unity of apperception" (objective unity of self-consciousness), only in relation to experience, synthesizes the unity of representations through forms of intuition and categories by the intellect (thus creating the object), and then, based on experiential data (objects and concepts of the intellect), performs the synthetic unity of apperception (representations of intuition are connected in one consciousness by one representation "I think").
The interpretation that we possess a priori knowledge is erroneous, as even the material of the synthetic unity of apperception has an empirical source. Kuderowicz, in his work on Kant, stated that the intellect has the ability to construct concepts of things in themselves, but they are only indefinite thoughts of empty content. The human mind does not have the capacity to create objects without referring to sensory intuition, and the existence of the divine is not proven. Consciousness does not possess a priori knowledge reflecting things in themselves (noumena). Kant's "Transcendental Idealism" is characterized by placing the subject at the center, who plays an active role in cognition, which, however, is limited to the sphere of phenomena (having no access to things in themselves).
Kant assumes only innate intellectual forms (cognitive processes) but does not recognize the possession of innate knowledge. In his system, only the "divine intellect" could have access to noumena, both perceiving and creating them at the same time, while humans are limited to representations that are not equivalents of reality but products of imagination concerning sensory data. We cannot say what the relationship of representations to things in themselves is (to what extent they correspond to them).
The Issue of Epistemological Idealism of Berkeley and the Existence of Kant's Noumena
The above issue of the relation of phenomena to noumena is connected with the problem of Berkeley's epistemological (dogmatic) idealism, which does not recognize the existence of objects outside our consciousness. Kant attempts to refute this concept by referring to the perceptual judgment, which states the existence of something outside consciousness. He also refers to the postulate of empiricism, according to which "statements of the existence of things in cognition are made in relation to the perception of things and their concept."
However, this argument does not solve the problem, as only when we comprehend a thing (realize it; have its representation) do we know of its existence, meaning we do not have unconscious perceptions, or having them, we cannot ascertain their possession (as that would require consciousness), thus we cannot ascertain their origin. Another argument Kant uses to defend the existence of reality is the forms of sensibility and intellectual concepts, which are also not legitimate, as representations could be autonomous creations of the intellect, in whose potential it could contain the construction of representations. Temporal and spatial duration of perceptual data is insufficient to refute epistemological idealism, as they may exist in the mind that would evoke these perceptions, and their durability can be justified by the existence of a constructed world in the mind (solipsism or dogmatic idealism).
My own argument against dogmatic idealism or solipsism refers to free will: If the world is only our representation, it should be dependent on our will, and it is not, unless we assume the existence of a subconscious that would generate phenomena perceived in pure intuition by forms of consciousness. In any case, I am not a proponent of Berkeley's idealism or solipsism; I merely believe that Kant's arguments are insufficient to refute them, similarly to Reid's "Common Sense," as it relies on human intuition, which is also unjustified (with the exception that collective consciousness would avoid the problem of solipsism, but the basic one – the existence of noumena – would remain).
Space and Time – A Priori or Empirical Forms of Intuition
Furthermore, the thesis that space and time are a priori and not empirical (belonging to the subject and not the world) is not sufficiently proven. Kant assumes the unity of space and time, which relate to all diversity of representations, but this does not justify that they cannot be relations prevailing among material objects, not belonging to them, but to the structure of reality (that is, being in relation to objects, and belonging to the world), instead of a priori forms of the intellect.
Space and time would be relations between objects, and the mind would perceive them along with representations. Kant's assumption that space and time are one for all representations does not preclude that they could come from the world, as each representation would contain this one space (relate to this one empirical space and object). Representation (phenomenon) would come from the intellect and constitute a form, and space and time and the object the content of cognition. Instead of performing preliminary synthesis (representation would have directly grasped in time and space and only accepted it), the intellect would construct concepts from representations, and the concepts of space and time would abstract from the multitude of representations.
The above concept is accepted by empiricists and constitutes a similarly unverifiable hypothesis as the one proclaimed by Kant. Another problem facing Kant's concept is Einstein's theory of relativity, which assumes the relativity of time and space, as they are not only different for different subjects but also not constant for them. It is interesting how Kant could relate representations to the changing time and space since he assumed their unity towards them.
This possibly indicates Kant's error, as then the intellect would have to possess a multitude and variety of forms of intuition (time and space) similar to how it possesses a multitude and variety of representations. Of course, Kant could not know Einstein's position for obvious reasons, but the empiricists' concept assuming that time and space are external properties of reality avoids the problem that the theory of relativity would pose to Kant.
Further Criticism of Kant's Epistemological Issues
To begin with, referring to some issues contained in point 1, I will expand the reason for rejecting Kant's apriorism (Paragraphs 17 and 18 "Deduction of Pure Intellectual Concepts"). It seems to me that it would be necessary to combine the "transcendental unity of apperception" (objective unity of self-consciousness) with the "empirical unity of intuition."
The main reason may be that both have their source in experience. Furthermore, Kant himself writes that these processes are analogous, and since they have the same source, thus even not being identical, they constitute successive stages of empirical cognition. I will start by differentiating between the notions Kant made in Paragraphs 17 and 18 "Deduction of Pure Intellectual Concepts" and then combine them into one empirical experience.
"Empirical unity of apperception" (subjective unity of consciousness, inner sense) is the result of combining representations concerning a certain phenomenon and is accidental; empirical diversity of intuition is given by it for the intellect to perform synthesis; it possesses only subjective validity; it is a reflection of transcendental unity of apperception; unity of consciousness in empirical representations is neither necessary nor universally binding.
"Empirical unity of apperception" (subjective unity of consciousness, inner sense) is the result of combining representations concerning a certain phenomenon and is accidental; empirical diversity of intuition is given by it for the intellect to perform synthesis; it possesses only subjective validity; it is a reflection of transcendental unity of apperception; unity of consciousness in empirical representations is neither necessary nor universally binding.
"Transcendental unity of apperception" (objective unity of self-consciousness) combines in the concept of an object the diversity given in intuition (also Paragraph 18).
Firstly, both syntheses are performed by the intellect. The intellect also performs the "synthetic unity of apperception," meaning the diversity of representations in intuition is connected into one consciousness; representations have a common act of apperception – the representation "I think" – gathering representations into one self-consciousness.
Transcendental and empirical unity of apperception, in essence, constitute successive stages in empirical cognition. The empirical is the effect of combining representations related to one phenomenon, and the transcendental combines into an object diverse representations originating from the empirical unity of apperception, in which the intellect binds sensory data into representations, and then through the intellect performs the synthetic unity of apperception (combining representations through one representation "I think" into conscious objects constituting self-consciousness).
The above reasoning explains why one can consider transcendental and empirical unity of apperception as successive stages in acquiring knowledge.
One should also not forget about "judgments," which constitute the synthesis of objects, that is, concepts (objects of the intellect are concepts and categories).
As Kant writes at the beginning of Paragraph 19), "The logical form of all judgments consists in the objective unity of apperception of the contained concepts." Kant defines "judgment" as a way of bringing given cognitions (concepts) to the objective unity of apperception (through categories of pure intellect that combine concepts).
Moreover, Kant distinguishes between empirical (accidental; experiential) and a priori (necessary; purely intellectual) judgments, which in my opinion should not differ, as both are constructed by the intellect and both are empirical (if they were to differ, at most by the degree of awareness, not by origin.
– "a priori judgments" would be identical to "empirical" as only the latter would be possible, as both types of judgments would be one "intellectual-empirical judgment," that is, based on empirical representations, processed by the intellect into concepts to which the intellect adds categories.
Therefore, in my opinion, only analytical and synthetic judgments (exclusively a posteriori, as postulated by empiricism) would be possible.
Kant assumed the apriorism of scientific knowledge; his transcendental philosophy involves analyzing the conditions of the existence and properties of knowledge and the conditions of cognition by the subject. Kant's transcendentalism recognizes sensory content and intellectual activities as complementary components of experience, thereby introducing "self-consciousness" into scientific cognition.
The above statement aligns with the empiricists' postulates, but Kant recognized not only empirical but also a priori cognition, as already mentioned. I will now focus on a more detailed critique of "perceptual judgments," which were previously only mentioned.
Critique of Perceptual Judgments
Kant did not equate experience with sensation or perception. He assumed that experience contains sensations from which sensory data originate but is not reducible to sensation or sensory perception. He introduced the concept of "perceptual judgments," which record sensations received from outside. Perceptual judgments distinguish real things from illusions.
Kant's postulate of empiricism states that the assertion of the existence of things encompassed by cognition occurs in the relationship between the perception of things and their concept.
If this postulate were valid, Berkeley's concept and solipsism would not be possible. I am not suggesting the existence of creations of imagination instead of reality but asserting that the perceptual judgment is insufficient to reliably state whether something exists or not, as we lack a criterion distinguishing illusions from perceptions (illusions, contrary to what Kant claims, can be a permanent phenomenon, as evidenced by examples of mental illnesses).
The mind influences the form of representations; it even has some impact on the content of experience, but it cannot be the primary source of representations unless we assume the possibility of innate knowledge or transcendental cognition. Kant writes in Paragraph 18 of the Prolegomena that perceptual judgments possess only subjective validity (meaning they are phenomena valid only for the individual subject, therefore not universally binding). Perceptual judgments are not related to the object (constructed by the intellect through categories from representations) but relate to sensory data without the participation of categories, thus they are not related to the object and do not have objective validity.
My critique of perceptual judgments boils down to their inability to prove the existence of the object to which they refer, which is their task. Empirical (experiential) judgments have objective validity but are related to the object, which is only a construct of empirical representations captured in categories by the mind, thus they also do not have direct access to things in themselves.
The intellect constructs the object based on representations and then confronts it with the real object (noumen), which is not directly accessible. Kant claims that empirical judgments are necessary and universal (constituting the subject of knowledge), but they are related to the object of the mind, not things in themselves.
Kant also assumes that the agreement of people regarding judgments indicates their truth, not recognizing that the general public can be mistaken, succumbing to collective illusions (such as the geocentric theory).
The argument from universal agreement is insufficient even against Berkeley's concept that representations exist only in the mind and are not matched by physical objects. The assertion of the truth of perceptual and empirical judgments must be limited to the level of possessed knowledge and the structure of the human mind.
Critique of Pure Intuition Concepts a priori
Additionally, we could construct empty concepts that seemingly relate to reality or do not concern it at all (we could not verify this) if we assume (as in some interpretations of Kant) the existence of a priori concepts of pure intuition, which the intellect would construct using categories.
A priori pure intuition concepts would constitute creations of imagination, limited only by the abilities of the mind, and since they do not refer to physical objects, they would not have to be consistent with them.
Kant writes in Paragraph 21 of "Deduction of Pure Intellectual Concepts": "The unity of self-consciousness indicates that the empirical consciousness of the diversity given in one intuition is subject to pure self-consciousness a priori, just as empirical intuition is subject to pure intuition a priori." In this passage, Kant assumes the unity of all knowledge and the dependence of empirical knowledge on a priori knowledge.
He claims that the unity of self-consciousness determines this dependence. Kant assumes that a priori concepts are the condition for the existence of empirical concepts (one must remember that a priori concepts are concepts of pure intellect, that is, categories, not a priori representations directly referring to things in themselves).
One could agree to the existence of a priori concepts not being categories only if a priori concepts are regarded solely as the potential for the formation of concepts in the intellect and not as concepts containing non-empirical content directly related to things in themselves.
Perhaps Kant created this thesis inspired by the "principle of pre-established harmony," according to which there is a state of concordance of experience among all subjects (monads), resulting from the action of the highest monad (God). In this principle, Leibniz assumed that we are closed monads and do not communicate with each other.
Kant assumes that our a priori knowledge corresponds to things in themselves, analogous to how monads, not having direct contact with the world and each other, function harmoniously, where representations visible to other monads correspond to monads. Thus, according to Kant, there is a parallelism (correspondence) between concepts and things in themselves, as well as between a priori and empirical concepts.
Kant probably recognized the possibility of creating a unity of empirical knowledge in the mind, which concerns the concept of synthetic unity of apperception, where the intellect synthesizes representations related to self-consciousness (transcendental unity of apperception) based on the phenomenal material captured by forms of sensibility (time and space) and originating from empirical intuition (empirical unity of self-consciousness).
However, it should be noted that no arguments support the acceptance of the thesis that concepts correspond to noumena. Leibniz's concept contains an anticipation of the principle that what is accepted by the general public is a criterion for the truth or existence of something, but this principle is also not legitimate, as collective illusions may result, for example, from the limitations of our nature or the lack of direct access to the object of cognition, as in the case of things in themselves (the general acknowledgment that something exists does not determine the actual existence of that something).
As is known, Kant recognized the dependence of the object of cognition on the cognizing subject, but only the form, not the existence of noumena and the content of representations, depends on it, unless we assume our intellect as the cause of things in themselves and the only cause of their representations (then representations would be no different from things in themselves, or representations given in intuition would be unnecessary, as we would directly perceive things in themselves, and representations and noumena would not differ in content or being – in this case, our intellect would correspond to Kant's notion of "divine intellect").
The problem of the relationship between concepts and things in themselves is also addressed by Wittgenstein; in his most famous quote, "the limits of my language are the limits of my world," he defines the scope of his epistemology, expressing that what is knowable is what can be expressed in words.
Kant's limits of cognition run similarly, as he recognizes as knowable only what can be formed into a concept and about which an existential judgment (perceptual) can be made; the quote: "what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" could be interpreted Kantianly as - we cannot speak of noumena, as they do not appear to us directly (we do not possess knowledge of them).
At the beginning of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein describes what the reality perceived by him is. He states that the world is a collection of facts, which are equivalents of states of affairs (combinations of objects, entities, things).
Wittgenstein believed that thought reflects facts, which also demonstrates the analogy to Kant, for whom empirical concepts derive from representations (phenomena; appearances) of things in themselves (noumena).
On the other hand, Kant spoke of a priori concepts derived from pure intuition (categories and concepts), which precede and are conditions for empirical intuition (empirical concepts), directly relating to things in themselves (noumena).
Another contemporary philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, adopted an empirical position differing in the course of the experience process. Kant distinguished between perceiving things and perceptions in the mind (division into the world in the mind and outside it). He differentiated nature into unknowable reality and its phenomena that do not represent noumena. Whitehead rejected this division of nature; he claimed that we have only one experience and within it, one set of phenomena belonging to one nature. He believed that "there is nothing outside the experience of subjects," which positions him in a stance intermediate to the above, as he acknowledged the central role of the subject in cognition but denied the idealistic division into a priori and empirical cognition, suggesting their unity (all perceptions have an empirical source and are subject to a priori mental functions).
Whitehead's position on cognition was characterized by realism and objectivity; he understood experience as a collection of real events independent of consciousness. In contrast to Kant, who thought that nature arises in consciousness, he asserted, in line with 20th-century naturalism, that consciousness has its source and cause in nature.
Returning briefly to the issue of pure intuition a priori, Kuderowicz, in his work on Kant, definitively rejected the interpretation that the intellect could independently create a priori concepts containing the content of things in themselves. He asserts (as confirmed in Paragraph 18 of the Prolegomena) that in pure intuition, only the forms of intellect, that is, categories, are contained, which organize empirical representations and create the object (of course, concerning noumena).
Differentiations of Processes and Concepts in Experience
(regarding the content of subpoints A-D) An important issue to clarify is the difference between "transcendental unity of apperception" and "synthetic unity of apperception"; these notions should not be confused. As I wrote in subpoint D) of the fourth point, our cognitive process divides into three stages, which together form the entirety of our knowledge.
The complementarity of these three stages indicates the unity of our knowledge. Another important matter is the concept of the "object." Kant uses it in several different meanings; firstly, as the equivalent of the thing in itself, that is, the noumen; secondly, as a construct of the intellect, to which representations refer (it is a synthesis of representations captured in categories by the intellect), it is the equivalent of "concept"; there is also talk of the object of pure intellect, where the object is equated with "thought," the one that is said cannot create concepts unrelated to empirical data, or category (concept of pure intellect).
I have presented this differentiation to distinguish elements appearing in experience that have the same term. Another differentiation is empirical intuition and pure intuition; the first concerns representations, while the second concerns concepts constructed from these phenomena and categories (there is a transition from empirical intuition to pure intuition, analogous to empirical unity of apperception and transcendental unity of apperception, in which processes these functions of intellect fulfill cognitive roles being subordinate to it). Concepts of pure and empirical intuition correspond to concepts of pure imagination and imagination.
Continuation of the Initial Comparison of Kant's and Wittgenstein's Epistemological Elements and the Issue of the Relation of Phenomenon and Noumenon
The first similarity in the concept of experience between Kant and Wittgenstein is their attitude toward things in themselves (noumena); both philosophers claim that the "thing in itself" is not given to us in cognition. Kant believes that the object is accessible to us only through the phenomenon.
Although we experience the object of cognition in some way, it does not appear directly but through the phenomenon, which in some degree reflects it.
It is possible that the so-called noumen is not accessible to our intellectual cognition due to the limitations of this cognitive faculty, but we experience it (the physical object; noumen or transcendental object) in contact with reality, in the process of perception (that is, in sensory data, we have access to the transcendental object or noumen but cannot comprehend it with intellect, form it into a concept, or classify it into a category we possess in the intellect).
The attitude toward noumen may be related to Wittgenstein's quote, "what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence," as we cannot make descriptive judgments about something we do not understand or experience.
It is possible, therefore, that we experience noumena, which leads to representations (phenomena) and awareness of the existence of things in themselves (we can make existential judgments about noumena but not descriptive ones).
The alternative that we do not experience noumena or transcendental objects seems unlikely to me, as we must have contact with the object of cognition to create a representation (phenomenon), which is its semblance.
Wittgenstein, in his theory of knowledge, defines the elements that compose the world as we perceive it. By the world, he understands a collection of facts, which are equivalents of states of affairs (combinations of objects, entities, things).
Wittgenstein asserted that thought reflects facts, which also demonstrates the analogy to Kant, for whom empirical concepts derive from representations (phenomena; appearances) of things in themselves (noumena).
Comparison of Synthetic Unity of Apperception with Stream of Consciousness and Kant's Influence on Phenomenology
I believe that the synthetic unity of apperception is similar to the concept of the stream of consciousness (perhaps this term, already used by British empiricists, in its phenomenological version corresponds to the concept of synthetic unity of apperception). The "stream of consciousness" means the sum of phases filling cognitive, emotional, imaginative acts (that is, all kinds of representations available to our consciousness).
The stream of consciousness is a continuous process and is related to one "I," which experiences all these components (it is a sequence of acts and states). Thus, the stream of consciousness is a collection of elements (representations) that are related to one "I" (apperception). The unity of representations, which constitutes the synthetic unity of apperception, is probably the equivalent of the stream of consciousness in the phenomenologists' view.
In the concept of synthetic unity of apperception, Kant emphasizes "self-consciousness," that is, awareness of experienced content; their conscious experiencing is possible thanks to the representation "I think" contained in all representations.
"Consciousness" in Phenomenology is a process of experiencing certain cognitive content, which undoubtedly refers to experience contained in Kant's concept. The most important representatives of Phenomenology (Husserl and Ingarden) were engaged in the study of consciousness. The fundamental concept for them was "pure consciousness" (similar to Kant's pure intellect due to its function), which performs cognitive acts and constructs concepts constituting the content of human consciousness. Following Kant's example, phenomenologists distinguished pure consciousness from empirical consciousness. Some (such as Husserl) differed from Kant in recognizing the possibility of knowing things in themselves as possible, seeing their source in experience.
Husserl, in his theory, included the idea of "eidetic insight," which allows direct access to essential content (e.g., the essence of being a thinking subject or the nature of the object). Husserl's "Eidetics" constitutes knowledge of "pure essences" (the equivalent of Kantian "noumena").
Insight into the nature of things in themselves occurs through intellectual processes such as "imaginative variation," which allows one to detach from the observation of some content and, through various imaginative associations of this content, perform the act of extracting the essence of a given phenomenon (universal or specific object).
The weak point of the theory lies in the fact that the author did not resolve the problem of whether the phenomenon or even the concept (specific or general) corresponds to the inaccessible thing in itself.
Husserl ignored or left unresolved the problem that prompted Kant to accept only the possibility of indirect knowledge of the world. Husserl also introduces the term eidetic reduction, which involves focusing on what in our experience is not dependent on the content of experiences but presents itself as an autonomous, ideal, and general content. However, concentrating on what is general in experiences leads us only to the feelings accompanying these experiences, analogous to the knowledge of the phenomenon in Kant, where from representations, we extract content from which we form a concept.
Therefore, what is general in relation to experiences is the emotional state associated with them. Husserl's "eidetic reduction" involves solely the self-knowledge of the subject, not the knowledge of reality, while "imaginative variation" does not have access to noumena, thus not expanding our knowledge of them, being merely the equivalent of Kantian empirical intuition.
Transcendental reduction, on the other hand, does not claim to know "noumena"; in essence, it involves suspending judgments (epoche) about external content, including the thesis that "the external world exists." Our cognition remains in the sphere of "pure consciousness," that is, cognitive acts and content.
In the above issue, Kant's research influence is also visible (resignation from knowledge of noumenon, focus on the subject's self-knowledge). The visible difference is that Kant assumed the existence of things in themselves, which phenomenologists were not sure of.
Phenomenology combines contemporary psychology (in the rendition of Franz Brentano) and Kant's epistemological views; it refers to phenomena (appearances) and also defines acts of consciousness and their cognitive possibilities.
Summary of the Above Issues
Philosophy owes Kant primarily for changing the approach to the issue of cognition. Kant continued the epistemological problems that appeared in Descartes, Berkeley, and Leibniz, creating his own concept based largely on science and a scientific approach.
The most important issue he addressed was the conditions for the possibility of knowing the world, from which his concept of judgments arose and particular focus on the knowing subject, which he considered the most important element of the cognitive process.
The most significant problem in Kant is the relationship between the knowing subject and the object known by him, where further difficulties such as the relationship of the phenomenon to the object (phenomenon to noumenon) and the possibility of knowing the world arise.
In general, Kant had a significant impact on the development of epistemology and psychology. The issues he introduced have not lost their relevance to this day, and some of them are still waiting for a satisfactory solution (e.g., the issue of the extent to which our representation corresponds to the real world and whether its existence can be proven).
Kant's scientific activity weighed on the entire subsequent philosophy (e.g., he was, alongside Franz Brentano, a precursor of phenomenology). Many of his issues were continued (such as in the neo-Kantian school and the above-mentioned phenomenology).
Critique of Aesthetic Reason, Part 8: Prolegomena to Kant
"Two things fill the soul with awe and reverence: the starry sky above me and the moral law within me. These are for me proof that there is a God above me and a God within me."
Perhaps the most famous quote from Immanuel Kant, which expresses not only his belief in God but also his amazement at the world and the diversity and multitude of its phenomena. Why did I decide to write an article about Kant? Because he is an extremely interesting philosopher, although, as is commonly known, extremely difficult to read. However, we should not be discouraged by the opinion about the philosopher but try to familiarize ourselves with his work, even fragmentarily. Is it worth being interested in Kant's philosophy? Yes! Especially his epistemology seems interesting, although other fields of science that Kant addressed also deserve attention.
In addition to the theory of knowledge, ethics and metaphysics occupy a special place in his theory.
My favorite passage from Kant's work comes from Critique of Pure Reason (op. cit. p. 256), in which Kant states:
"We have not only traversed the land of pure intellect, not only have we carefully examined every part of it, but we have also traversed it and marked a place for everything in it. However, this land is an island, enclosed by nature itself within immutable boundaries. It is a land of truth (what a delightful name!), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the proper abode of illusion, where many a fog bank and rapidly melting ice falsely pretend to be new lands and, deceiving the sailor seeking discoveries with endlessly futile hopes, entangle him in adventures from which he can never withdraw nor complete."
"Before we dare [to venture] onto this sea to explore all its expanses and ascertain [whether] there is anything to expect from them, it will be useful first to glance at the map of the country we are about to leave and ask, first, whether we could be content with what it contains, or whether we must necessarily be content if there is no other land where we could settle; secondly, by what right we even possess this country and can maintain ourselves in it securely against all hostile claims."
In this text, Kant describes our cognitive situation, as our knowledge of reality is modest and uncertain. What is available to us are sensory data, which, as I have experienced myself, often deceive us, as Descartes also pointed out, drawing the conclusion that one should not trust the senses, as they often mislead us.
However, one does not need to be mentally ill to subjectively interpret sensory impressions. This is a rather common phenomenon, the cause of which lies in our ego, complexes, and projections of the mind.
It often seems to us that someone is criticizing us and has hostile intentions towards us, but this is not necessarily the case. It may result from personality disintegration, which involves disturbances in cognitive, emotional, and motivational skills, but not to limit this phenomenon only to mental illnesses, which are merely extreme cases of this phenomenon, it is worth noting that the cognitive processes of ordinary people are often tainted with errors, as can be objectively determined, for example, in the game of chess, where players often make mistakes, and reality is much more complicated and complex than the logical game of chess.
Illusions, beliefs, and other cognitive errors are not exceptional but rather the rule. It is also said, "to err is human." Literary characters like Ajax, Othello, or Don Quixote are good examples of this. A well-known psychological defense mechanism in individuals is projection, which involves transferring one's feelings, views, or character traits to others, constituting a psychological cognitive error.
Generally, in my opinion, the cause of mental illnesses lies in negative past experiences, personality disorders, or being lost in social reality. Kant was not only a distinguished philosopher but also a good psychologist, as evidenced by his texts in the fields of ethics and epistemology.
Another noteworthy passage comes from Kant's Metaphysics of Morals and concerns virtue. Kant writes in it: "... In the very concept of virtue, it is already contained that it is not something innate but must be acquired; this can be known without relying on anthropological observations, for this kind of knowledge arises only from experience.
Otherwise, we could not call human moral ability a virtue – it must first show fortitude and steadfastness in the struggle with its greatest enemy, i.e., inclinations. Virtue is thus a product of pure practical reason, to the extent that it has gained the upper hand over that adversary, guided by a conscious and steadfast resolution (which arises from freedom)..."
Thus, as Kant states, virtue has its source in human freedom, additionally used in a good way, that is, for one's own good and the good of others. And what are the mentioned inclinations? They are drives, habits, and addictions that destroy a person, such as drugs, alcohol, sexual urges, or other harmful phenomena associated with civilizational diseases, environmental pollution, or the exploitation of natural resources.
Perhaps in Kant's times, technology was not as developed, and people had slightly different problems, but human nature is generally unchanging, as we still live in "caves," work, and perform rituals, believe in myths and gods, watch shadows on computer and television screens instead of seeking contact with other people, reality, and the truth about it and ourselves.
What Did Kant Think About?
"Two things fill the soul with awe and reverence: the starry sky above me and the moral law within me. These are for me proof that there is a God above me and a God within me."
Immanuel Kant
Hello! I have decided to start a series of short articles titled "What Did Philosophers Think About." I know that the association with Leszek KoĊakowski's program titled "What Do Great Philosophers Ask Us?" immediately comes to mind, but I will try to make my series as original as possible, although, as is commonly known, originality is not always the highest value in philosophy, unlike in art. So let's start with the question: What did Kant think about?
Certainly about many different interesting things, especially philosophical problems. One of them is the question: Is metaphysics possible as a science? Since Aristotle, no one questioned the scientific nature of metaphysics. However, Kant, in his reflections, concluded that it is not as obvious as it is commonly believed.
What, then, is metaphysics if not a science? For neopositivists, metaphysics is similar to religion, superstition, or erroneous thinking not supported by any rational arguments or evidence. Why did neopositivists (and also pragmatists) question the validity of metaphysics? It may stem from the very nature of metaphysics, which is based on empirically unverifiable theses and axioms that are impossible to confirm or refute. Metaphysics is also hindered by a high degree of abstraction and speculative character, making it vulnerable to attacks from empirical and skeptical positions. Has anything of metaphysics survived to our times? Does metaphysics have a chance to regain its place in philosophy? Or is it doomed to failure and oblivion?
Let's start with the question: What do we understand by metaphysics? According to Aristotle, "there is a science that studies being as such and the essential attributes belonging to it." This science is metaphysics. Whether we agree with Aristotle or not, we must admit that the issue of metaphysics is important to us, regardless of whether metaphysics exists and whether it is a science. If we admit that metaphysics does not exist and is not a science, we will side with skeptics, (neo)positivists, and pragmatists. If we admit that metaphysics exists and is a science, we will represent idealism and its various currents. We can also choose a middle path and state that metaphysics exists but is not a science.
If we deny the scientific nature of metaphysics, what could it be? Perhaps a worldview? Returning to Kant, let's ask: What was metaphysics for him? As he writes in the preliminary remarks to the Prolegomena: "First of all, as far as the sources of metaphysical knowledge are concerned, it is already contained in its concept that they cannot be empirical. The principles of this knowledge (and they include not only its fundamental assertions but also its fundamental concepts) can never be derived from experience, because this knowledge is supposed to be not physical but metaphysical, i.e., lying beyond the boundaries of experience. Therefore, the basis of this knowledge will not be either external experience, which is the source of proper physics, nor internal experience, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, i.e., knowledge flowing from pure intellect and pure reason."
The above characterization of metaphysics already suggests that it is a speculative "science," based on the categories of pure intellect, rather than sensory cognition. Moreover, according to Kant, metaphysics, unlike natural science, which for him was the ideal of science, lacks rigor and objectivity.
Metaphysics, to be recognized as a science, must adhere to scientific principles, that is, be intersubjective, and its axioms provable. Under the influence of Kant's critical theory, among others, the creator of contemporary scientific methodology, Karl R. Popper, believed that metaphysics is unscientific because its theses cannot be falsified due to their non-empirical nature. Neopositivists claim that metaphysics is closer to poetry than science, as there are no reliable methods for verifying the truth of its axioms. Is there a way to create a scientific metaphysics? Or is metaphysics, by definition, something unscientific?
The debate between analytical philosophy and contemporary metaphysical positions concerning the scientific nature of philosophy is unlikely to be resolved soon. We are left to adopt a more justified worldview, and as is known, each of them has certain reasons. For example, if we adopt the pragmatic concept of truth, we must abandon the hope for a holistic vision of the world, while if we consider the classical theory of truth to be true, we will face the problem that we cannot be sure that our thought will correspond to reality.
We may choose to agree with William James, who advocated pluralism in opposition to monism because our experience indicates that there are many worldviews of similar practical value, and the belief in one absolute truth (e.g., in religion) is unjustified. Similarly, the issue of metaphysics is dependent on life experience. If we find that a religious worldview gives us a sense of purpose and faith in the future, in contrast to a scientific worldview, we should believe. However, if we find that belief in dogmas, God, angels, demons, and the afterlife is contrary to reason and experience, we should be atheists.
Similarly: If I have no other evidence of human freedom in the world than my consciousness and belief in free will, in contrast to determinism, which takes away the meaning of life and freedom, I should believe in freedom, despite being aware that all our actions are programmed in DNA and constitute a game between various random and non-random factors in the world. Forgive me this digression.
Returning to Kant, it is worth mentioning that his discoveries in philosophy represent a paradigm shift in the theory of knowledge and one of the more coherent modern systems. Kant's critical philosophy initiated a breakthrough in the perception of philosophical problems. Kant, on the issue of free will, wrote in his ethical work titled Metaphysics of Morals: "Now we see that when we conceive of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves to the world of reason as its members and acknowledge the autonomy of the will with its consequence, morality; but when we conceive of ourselves as obligated, we regard ourselves as belonging to the world of senses and at the same time to the world of intellect." According to Kant, freedom implies moral responsibility, with which even the existentialist J.P. Sartre would agree.
Kant's philosophy encompasses many important issues and problems, such as free will, truth, good and evil, or the existence of God.
"I claim that: a human being and, in general, any rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means which this or that will may use at its discretion, but must be regarded at the same time as an end in all its actions, both concerning itself and other rational beings."
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals
I hope you found something interesting for yourself in the extraordinary work of the great German philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Kant was not only a distinguished philosopher and scientist but also a great person whose work has a significant impact on the development of philosophy. The emergence of Critique of Pure Reason and other works of the philosopher played an important role in the history of contemporary thought, particularly important for the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, as well as ethics.
As we know, Kant was also a promoter of the idea of both personal and political freedom. In conclusion, the significance of Kant's philosophy is still relevant today, and his work continues to have an influence and remains a subject of interest for philosophers.